Many secure auction protocols were created. BJK (Byoungcheon Lee, Kwangjo Kim e Joongsoo Ma 2001) defined an efficient protocol for English auctions that can be used also for Reverse auctions. Chung (Yu Fang Chung 2008) created an improvement of BJK, however there are still some security faults that can be explored by attackers in these two protocols. In this article, we define a protocol based on BJK that is an improvement of it with the addition of security's treatment to attacks of Collusive Shill Bidding e Sniping.
INTRODUCTION
Internet auction is today a very popular and profitable industry. Many enterprises like Ebay, Arremate, etc; have invested in non-presence auctions. The fact that the auctions participants are not committed to be in same place brought many benefits however also many ways to cheat. There are a lot of mechanisms of cheating and many safe auctions protocols were created to solve them. These protocols were based on many cryptographic concepts like: Group Signature, Threshold Cryptography, Schnorr Signature, etc. Each solution was created to fulfill characteristics for each type of auction (English, Reverse, Sealed, etc) . In this article we will present a protocol for reverse auctions. The presented protocol is based in the one proposed by BJK(Byoungcheon Lee, Kwangjo Kim e Joongsoo Ma 2001) that works very well for English and Reverse auctions. Our protocol comes to improve protocol with the use of digital certificates and a module to avoid frauds techniques known as Collusive Shill Biddings and Sniping (Trevathan, Jarrod and Read, Wayne 2006) that are not considered in any actual secure auction protocol (This protocol is being proposed to brazilian government that uses reverse auctions to buy services).
EXISTING PROTOCOL
The BJK protocol is one of the best already created but it still has some problems:
1. K i keys exchange are done using Diffie-Hellman without authentication which enables "Man in the Middle" attack.
2. It uses Schnorr signature for authentication of bidder that is not very used in commercial certificates(RSA and DSA are the most used).
3. It does not consider attacks like Shill Bidding and Sniping.
We propose a protocol wich is an improvement of BJK where:
1. All auction's bidders will use DSA digital certificates for authentication.
2. The keys exchange using Diffie-Hellman will be done using DSA certificates for authentication with bidder doing this exchange with Auctionner through Register Manager(RM).
3. A fraud module(FM) will implement Shill Bidding detection.
4. Anti Sniping policies will be implemented by RM. 
Our Protocol
Tickets" database.
Remarks:
The Auctioneer does not know the correspondence of y i and (Y k i ) as RM does not know from T i and r i . See that a bidder can verify round ticket T i calculating:
) and this value can be calculated by B i because he/she has K i and t i and he/she knows how to calculate h k (t i ).
Bidding
The bidder B i that wants to participate in round k of auction must follow the steps defined below while the auction's round has not expired:
(a) Calculates his round key
and verifies if it's in "Round Keys" board defined by RM.
)) x i and takes his ticket
i. m i = (auction's round number || bid's value) ii. Signs m i with Schnorr's Signature of Knowledge to assure anonymity: 
Winner Definition (a) After auction's round has finished, RM and
Auctionner take the lists of "Bids", "Round Keys" and "Round Tickets" boards and find bidders identities following the steps: 3. γ: How many times the bidder has won over the auction's rounds he participated in.
4. δ: The average inter bid time of bidder in the auction's rounds he participated in.
5. ε: The average inter bid increments in the auction's rounds he participated in. 6. ζ: indicates how early in an auction's round bidder i started bidding. These ratings are defined in interval (0, 1). The higher values, more suspicious the bidder is. If zero values, bidder has won the auction.
Based on these ratings, we can calculate a shill score for one bidder as: SS = ((θ 1 α+θ 2 β+θ 3 γ+θ 4 δ+θ 5 ε+θ 6 ζ)/(θ 1 +θ 2 + θ 3 + θ 4 + θ 5 + θ 6 )) × 10 where 1 ≤ θ i ≤ 6
For the case of Collusive Shill Bidding, there are more than one bidder working together and the calculation of these ratings and their scores doesn't imply that the bidders are in an agreement. Only using these parameters to detect shills can include legitimate bidders. Then, other techniques should be used. There are three ways a collusive shill bidding act and we can create mechanisms to detect them.
Forms of Collusive Shill Bidding
1. Alternating bids: Shills (a shill is a bidder that participates in a collusive Shill Bidding) bid in only one auction's round to increase or decrease the price.
2. Alternating rounds: Bidders take turns bidding as a collusive shill in different auction's rounds with one shill per round.
3. Hybrid: Bidders take turns bidding as a collusive shill in more than one auction's round simultaneously.
Detection Mechanisms using Graphs

Collusion Graph
To detect the collusive shill biddings, it's defined the concept of Collusion Graphs. A collusion graph is defined as G=(V,E) where V is the set of bidders and E is the edges between them. Each edge e i, j exists if they participated in a same auction's round. Each edge has a weight w i that defines the number of times two bidders v i and v j participated in same auction's round. If the two bidders participated together in only one auction's round, w i = 0 and w i >= 1 otherwise. Each edge has a weight w i , 1 <= i <= l, where l is the number of bidders, that defines the number of times two bidders v i and v j participated in more than one auction's round together.(See example on figure 2 below). Each bidder collusion rating is normalized as:
(n max −n min ) where n min is the lowest value of all values n ′ i and n max the highest. According to n ′ j normalized values, suspicious bidders are separated as sets denoted by C k and C = {C 1 ,C 2 ,C 3 , .,C k } is the set of bidders grouped by n ′ j . If two bidders, b i and b j , are suspicious and they have similar collusion rate, i.e., n ′ j = n ′ i + λ where λ is an error factor, they will be in a same collusion set. Bidders not suspicious will be in a set of one element. See that 1 <= k <= l where l is the total number of bidders. The n ′ j values are then used to join suspicious in a same set and preserve the correct bidders.
The collusion graph is used in Alternating bids form.
Dual Graph
It's a graph used in Alternating rounds form. It's the opposite of Collusion graph. In this graph, two nodes are connected if they didn't participate in same auction's round. In this graph, we are not interested in the quantity of how many auctions they participated but in if they weren't cooperating or not in same round. So weight information has value one(1) if there's cooperation and zero (0) Each bidder collusion rating is normalized as:
where θ min is the lowest + λ where λ is an error factor, they will be in a same collusion set. Bidders not suspicious will be in a set of one element. See that 1 <= k <= l where l is the total number of bidders.
The dual graph is used in Alternating rounds form.
Alternating Bids
Bidders with similar collusion ratings defined by collusion graph will have high probability to be in a same shill. However this parameter isn't enough to define that a bidder belongs to a shill. It's observed that shill bidders in alternating bids have identical β ratings. Based on that, a variable called bidding factor is defined as:
It defines how similar two bidders are for this type of collusive shill.
The parameters n For each set C k that is not singleton, it is calculated bidder's collusion score and bidders with similar collusion score will be defined as bidders of a same shill.
Alternating Rounds
In alternating rounds, as in alternating bids, we can define collusive bidders based on parameter Collusion Score. However to calculate it, we observe a different characteristic. It's observed that shill bidders in alternating rounds have identical α ratings. Based on that, the bidding factor is defined as:
These parameters θ ′ i , φ α i, j , ζ, δ and ε are then combined together to define a new parameter called Collusion Score.
) × 10, where φ α σ is the average of all φ α i, j . For each set C θ k that is not singleton, it is calculated bidder's collusion score and bidders with similar collusion score will be defined as bidders of a same shill.
Hybrid
The hybrid's form combines the alternating bids and alternating rounds form. It uses both graphs for detection of shills. It uses the Collusion Score as:
) × 10, where φ β σ and φ β σ are calculated for alternating bids and rounds forms like already defined in the last sections.
Sniping
To avoid sniping in an auction, it should be followed policies to avoid them. The most used technique to avoid it is to extend auction time if there are bids sent in the last minutes. In this paper, as defined in Bidding phase of protocol, the auction is extended x minutes if there are bids sent in the last 2 minutes (x is a parameter defined by auctineer). It avoids bids run in the last minutes. Sniping is a very known technique used by bidders in the most popular auctions of internet like Ebay, etc; but this behavior of bidders is not accepted because it does not allows the real English(Reverse) auction process of price increasing(or decreasing) in a period of time. Sniping transforms English(Reverse) auction in a sealed auction because almost all the bidders bid at the very end of auction's round time with each one sending a sealed letter at the same time. 
ANALYSIS
Protocol
Sniping
There are not cost associated to this part of module because the techniques to avoid Sniping are very simple according to section above.
CONCLUSIONS
It's already known the efficiency of BJK protocol for English auctions, but it does not consider none cryptographic attacks. Our protocol intends to improve BJK's one adding techniques for treatment of Collusive Shill Bidding and Sniping attacks.It also adds authentication through DSA digital certificates. Our protocol is built in a such form to protect reverse auctions against these forms of attacks. We are simulating all protocol to prove his efficiency with real data. We are also trying to implement improvements like the ones proposed by Chung.
